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Are explicatures cancellable? Toward a theory
of the speaker’s intentionality1
ALESSANDRO CAPONE
An explicature is a combination of linguistically encoded and contextually in-
ferred conceptual features. The smaller the relative contribution of the contextual
features, the more explicit the explicature will be, and inversely. (Sperber and Wil-
son 1986: 182).
Abstract
The aim of this paper is to reflect on the necessity of pragmatic develop-
ment of propositional forms and arrive at a better understanding of the level
of meaning which Sperber and Wilson and Carston call ‘explicature’. It is
also argued that the pragmatically conveyed elements of explicatures are
not cancellable—unlike conversational implicatures. While Capone (2003)
addressed the issue of the cancellability of explicatures from a merely em-
pirical point of view, in this paper a number of important theoretical ques-
tions are raised and discussed. In particular it is proposed that the analysis
of the notion of intentionality and the nature of pragmatic intrusion will set-
tle the question of the cancellability of explicatures. An explicature can be
considered a two-level entity. It consists of a logical form and a pragmatic
increment that the logical form gives rise to in the context of an utterance.
However, both the initial logical form and the pragmatic increment are the
target of pragmatic processes. Consequently, we need a pragmatic process
to promote the initial logical form to an intended interpretation and another
pragmatic process to derive further increments starting from the initial log-
ical form as promoted to an utterance interpretation.
1. Introduction
The boundary between semantics and pragmatics has been the object
of much recent linguistic theorizing and discussions. It is an outcome of
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dialectical conflicts that better theories emerge, in which a number of
errors are purged, arguments are refined and perspectives are broadened.
The aim of this paper is to reflect on the necessity of pragmatic develop-
ment of propositional forms and to arrive at a better understanding of the
level of meaning which Sperber and Wilson and Carston famously call
‘‘explicatures’’ (or ‘‘explicature’’) and to support the claim that explica-
tures are not cancellable—unlike conversational implicatures2. This paper
is intended to advance the discussion on the semantics/pragmatics debate
acknowledging the importance of relevance theorists’ contribution to the
issue. While the notion of explicature is originally Sperber and Wilson’s
(1986), Carston (1999, 2002a, 2002b, 2004a, 2004b) has further refined
the notion by ample discussion. If, however, my assumption that explica-
tures are not cancellable is correct, a number of its connected ideas must
be changed, and it is possible that this theoretical move will precipitate
positive consequences on the theory as a whole as claimed in Capone
(2003, 2006) in a discussion of ‘‘Grice’s circle.’’ Here, for the sake of sim-
plicity of discussion, I propose to divorce the issue of ‘‘explicatures’’ from
that of ‘‘Grice’s circle.’’ While Capone (2003) addressed the issue from a
merely empirical point of view, in this paper a number of important the-
oretical questions are raised and discussed. In particular I think that the
analysis of intentionality and the nature of pragmatic intrusion will settle
the question of the cancelability of explicatures. An explicature can be
considered a two-level entity, in that it consists of a logical form and a
pragmatic increment found in the context of the utterance. However,
both the initial logical form and the pragmatic increment are the target
of pragmatic processes, in that we need a pragmatic process to promote
the initial logical form to a serious intended interpretation and another
pragmatic process to derive further increments as promoted to a serious
utterance interpretation.
2. The cancelability of conversational implicatures
I propose to settle the issue of the cancelability of conversational implica-
tures before considering the issue of the cancelability of explicatures, as
the two issues are connected. Through both implicatures and explicatures,
a speaker intends to have a certain meaning recognized by a recipient. In
both cases we are faced with intended messages.
That things are not always easy can be shown by using one of Paul
Grice’s celebrated examples (1989: 33). A is writing a testimonial about
a candidate for a philosophy job, and his letter reads as follows: ‘‘Dear
Sir, Mr. X’s command of English is excellent and his attendance at tuto-
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rials has been regular. Yours etc.’’ Surely A cannot be unable to say
more, since the man is his pupil; moreover, he knows that more informa-
tion than this is wanted. He must, therefore, be wishing to impart infor-
mation that he is reluctant to write down, thus implying that he thinks
Mr. X is not a good philosopher.
Granting that the teacher manages to convey some message above
what is literally said and that the quantity of what is said is an element
in the interception of the communicated message, one may contend that
the implicature is not cancelable. I doubt that the teacher may write a sec-
ond letter saying ‘‘I apologize for that cryptic message; Mr X would have
deserved a longer letter (. . .) In fact, I recommend Mr X for the philoso-
phy job in question.’’ Implicated messages cannot be retracted, in o‰cial
circumstances; intentions cannot be ‘‘disintegrated’’ (or unimplicated) by
further messages if the circumstances are such that these intentions are
unequivocally calculated.
An objection may be raised to such considerations. One may say that
the interpretation of the philosopher’s revision is tricky: though A could
deny not having supported his student, he certainly could not assert his
support. Implicature cancellations are connected with the capacity to
deny having implicated that Q by asserting P, but not the capacity to as-
sert Q as a possible repair to having asserted P. This objection is based on
the assumption that the implicature is somehow di¤erent from the one
noted by Grice, that the writer is not supporting Mr X. On this interpre-
tation, it makes sense to deny the implicature. Assuming that this is a rea-
sonable interpretation, why is it that the philosopher’s revision cannot ex-
plicitly support Mr X? Presumably the reason is that, in addition to the
implicature that the writer was not supporting Mr X’s application, there
is another implicature salient, namely that A thinks X is a poor philoso-
pher. This is not an implicature that can be denied. The problem of this
tricky example lies in the fact that language is embedded in a social situ-
ation, in which rules of conduct partially determine the meanings which
words—or their absence—have.
It may be useful to distinguish here between generalized and particular-
ized conversational implicatures. Generalized conversational implicatures
are default inferences (Levinson 2000) that get through in a default con-
text, in the absence of clues about what the context is like, in which con-
text plays a negative role and can cancel an inference in case a conflict
arises between contextual cues and the default implicature. In the neo-
Gricean framework advocated by Levinson, the common ground is
thought of as a bucket containing all the facts mutually assumed through
common knowledge or assertion. The defeasibility of implicature genera-
tion is explained in the following way: We add the content of a new
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assertion in the bucket strictly in the order below only if each incrementa-
tion is consistent with the contents of the bucket:
Entailments;
Quantity Generalized Conversational Implicatures
Clausal;
Scalar;
Manner Generalized conversational implicature;
Generalized conversational I-implicatures [due to the principle of minimi-
zation]. (Levinson 2000: 90).
Particularized conversational implicatures, instead, are inferential aug-
mentations in which contextual assumptions loom large in determining/
fixing a communicative intention through reasoning. There may be dis-
agreement as to the level or degree of conscious reasoning actually
occurring in the calculation of particularized conversational implicatures.
Relevance theorists, for example, prefer to see these inferences as occur-
ring at a subconscious level. I do not exclude that both modes of infer-
ence are available and that we have to distinguish, case by case, between
conscious pragmatic reasonings and subconscious pragmatic interpreta-
tive processes.
Scholars such as Burton-Roberts believe that particularized conversa-
tional implicatures, cannot be cancelled without contradiction of what
is intended. This correlates with the intuition that the more salient a
speaker’s intention to implicate, the less cancellable the implicature will
be. (Burton-Roberts 2006: 10)3.
3. Why is the issue of implicature cancellation relevant to the issue of
explicature cancellation?
The issue of implicature cancellation is relevant to the issue of explicature
cancellation because the cases of explicatures analyzed by Wilson and
Sperber (2002) and Carston (2002a) are cases of inferences in particular
contexts. Consider the following utterance produced by Mary in reply to
an invitation to join us for dinner. When she says ‘‘I’ve already eaten,’’ at
the level of the propositional form we assign a constituent involving a
temporal concept and we understand her intention of saying that she has
eaten at a time interval ranging from a couple of hours to a few minutes
ago. We certainly do not interpret Mary as saying that she ate three days
ago, since this information would no longer count as an explanation for
her refusal to have more food. Why is this the case? Intentionality is an
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important factor in our decision and since intentionality cannot be ascer-
tained telepathically (to use an expression from Wedgwood 2007), we
must rely on features of the context to direct us toward the right inten-
tion. We discard the hypothesis that Mary means that she ate days ago,
as this would hardly be relevant to our invitation. A move that is relevant
to an invitation to eat is either acceptance or refusal. Since no acceptance
has been issued, Mary’s utterance can only count as an explanation (of
her decision to have no more food) and the explanation must rely on the
assumption that she has eaten immediately before the invitation as human
beings cannot eat when their stomach is crammed. Try now to nullify this
inferential work. You will be unable to do so, because inferential commu-
nication is due to pragmatics and pragmatics cannot be overruled by
pragmatics4. If this were the case, then there would be no rational way
of communicating with people.
In both particularized implicatures and explicatures, we are faced with
the same problem. Pragmatics cannot be overruled by pragmatics. Only
semantics can be overruled by pragmatics. In both cases, we are faced
with intentionality, evinced through the pragmatic resources of the lan-
guage, that cannot be retracted because pragmatics cannot be overruled
by pragmatics. It is not just the question of intentionality, as Burton-
Roberts puts it, that decides the issue. Intentionality, on its own, is inert.
It is in the mind of the speaker and not telepathically transmitted to the
hearer. Only through communication is the intentionality of the speaker
inferentially relevant to attributions of intentionality on the part of the
hearer; in the (actual) pragmatic process no room is left for cancelability
of particularized implicatures or explicatures.
The reason particularized implicatures cannot be cancelled is the same
that prevents explicatures from being cancelled. When a strong intention-
ality is projected, it can no longer be retracted. Implicatures only arise if
intended and recognized if intended. But then it should be impossible to
cancel an implicature: how would it be possible to withdraw/cancel what
was intended to be implicated and was recognized as intended? An impli-
cature could only be withdrawn/cancelled if it were NOT intended. But
then it wouldn’t BE an implicature (since implicatures by definition are
intended); in other words, there would BE no implicature to cancel. This
is relevant to the issue of explicature cancellation only in this: presum-
ably, explicatures must be intended and must be recognized as intended.
So the above applies to explicatures as much as to implicatures. And this
consideration of regarding explicatures as uncancelable is IN ADDI-
TION to the other considerations which you and I advance for saying
that explicatures specifically cannot be cancelled. (Burton-Roberts, per-
sonal communication).
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Should we abandon the cancelability test altogether (thus avoiding con-
sidering cancelability the hallmark of conversational implicature)? It is
amazing that Grice, who seemed happy about coupling his notion of con-
versational implicature with his notion of intentionality, did not notice
the impasse that the two notions were leading to. The only cases of con-
versational implicatures that are really cancellable are those in which the
intention to communicate an assumption p is least obvious, evident, and
recognizable. Presumably these cases, by strict standards, as Burton-
Roberts seems to imply above, should not even be categorized as conver-
sational implicatures. If so, then it is reasonable to assert the strong
hypothesis that conversational implicatures are not cancellable (in prac-
tice5), which carries the implication that explicatures are not cancellable.
Explicatures too, in fact, are inferences which must be intended and rec-
ognized as intended.
However, we should find it useful to limit ourselves to the claim that
only particularized implicatures are not cancellable, involving the recog-
nition of certain intentions (by the speaker) on the part of the hearer.
These are the cases in which the pragmatic resources of the language
point towards an unequivocal intention, making it awkward or di‰cult
to cancel the intention.
One such case is that of the attribution of a serious intention to a
speaker in virtue of having pro¤ered ‘‘p’’. Deciding whether the speaker
seriously intended to assert ‘‘p’’ is no minor matter, clearly showing the
nexus between pragmatic processing and arriving at a non-cancellable in-
tention. It should be noted, following Bach (2001), that the semantic re-
sources of a language are not su‰cient to project intentionality. This is a
point reiterated also by Recanati (2007: 37), who says (following Frege)
that if a sentence lacks the force of a serious assertion, making the con-
tent of the sentence more complex by means of operators such as ‘‘It is
true that’’ or ‘‘I assert that’’ will not change the situation, since whether
or not an utterance is serious is a pragmatic matter—a matter of force
and not content.
Suppose I say ‘‘Bush will be remembered for giving prosperity to
USA’’ (here in the written text there is no disambiguating intonation). Al-
though everyone will grant that I am using the conventions of English in
expressing my thought, it is not clear that literal meaning is a firm guide
to the speaker’s intentions. You will not just look at the words I used, but
will most certainly embed the sentence in the context in which it was pro-
duced. Given the mismatch between the semantic content of the sentence
and the current state of the US economy, you will use your reasoning
abilities to decide that my intention really cannot be serious. Now, Bach’s
considerations are nice because they imply that no semantic device can
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settle the issue of the seriousness of the speaker’s intentions. Suppose I
then say: ‘‘Look, I am seriously telling you that Bush brought prosperity
to USA’’. It could be useful to use the word ‘‘seriously’’ to indicate that I
speak with serious intentions. The hearer will give the speaker another
chance and will try to find out again whether such intentions match with
the propositions usually accepted in the broad context of the conversa-
tion. Yet, after the search has produced no context in which the inten-
tions could be serious, the hearer will give up the search and will settle
for an interpretation in which the speaker could not be serious. The truth
is that if literal meanings are not su‰cient to guarantee that the commu-
nicative intention behind the sentence is serious, no use of literal devices
for expressing a serious intention will do. They will be undermined by the
applicable pragmatic resources.
Now if this consideration is plausible, it is clear that the matter of infer-
ring the speaker’s intentions given a context of utterance and the clues
used by the speaker is such that it is not at all easy to retract intentions.
As an example, consider the case of a politician who harasses his female
secretary by making an indecent proposal. Suppose he later asserts that
he did not really intend his message. After all, if what Bach says is true
and we need pragmatic processing in ascertaining whether someone seri-
ously intended to assert ‘‘p’’, this line of defense would not be totally un-
reasonable. Here a problem opposite to the one noted by Bach arises. The
problem is not so much how to prove that the speaker’s intentions were
serious, but whether one could, instead, prove in court that one’s inten-
tions were not serious. The problem has to do with what kind of interpre-
tation an utterance is given in a context, given that it is clear to the
speaker that the contextual resources of the language will lead a hearer
to infer a certain intention and that the context in which the utterance
was produced will make it impossible to deny that intention. Pragmati-
cians have not given enough thought to this kind of problem. They take
for granted that conversational implicatures (or explicatures) are cancel-
lable, but in a number of contexts it is not possible to lead the hearer to
infer a certain intention allowing her the freedom to cancel that inference.
The fact is, as discussed in Capone (2005), we should give attention to a
number of linguistic phenomena in which individual intentionality is ex-
pressed by resorting to the social intentionality involved in performing a
certain action. In Capone (2005) I claimed that a number of inferences
arise in context and are simply not cancellable. This is because there are
conventions or rules of semantic interpretation based on discourse prac-
tices and contextual clues. These pragmatic phenomena are inferential
contributions on par with conversational implicatures, yet being based
on actual aspects of context, they have all the features of particularized
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implicatures, and, hence, cannot be cancelled. Consider utterances such
as ‘‘I saw you’’ is the classroom. The teacher notices that Michelangelo
(his favourite student) whispers the answer to a question to his desk
mate. The teacher says ‘‘I saw you’’. This is not just an accusation, but
an order to Michelangelo to stop what he is doing. How can this speech
act be transformed into the speech act ‘‘stop prompting’’? It is the social
situation with the rules and expectations governing students’ obligations
and teachers’ tasks that promote the inhibitive interpretation of ‘‘I saw
you’’. In this context, it is out of the question that the utterance could
count as a compliment—such an interpretation simply cannot occur.
In fact, no matter how highly the teacher thinks of Michelangelo it is
unlikely that the hearer will choose the tortuous path of individual inter-
pretation and proceed from considerations of his teacher’s high esteem
for him to the interpretation that the speech act counts as a compliment.
Michelangelo will almost certainly choose the social path of interpreta-
tion to his own individual path (Jaszczolt 1999). Thus, he is able to work
out that the teacher, despite his high opinion of him, actually wants
him to stop whispering answers to his desk mate. This is clearly a case
in which, when the communicative intention is fixed, it should not be
retracted.
Consider a case in which individual intentionality and social intention-
ality clash. Pippo De Lorenzo wrote a letter to the University Chancellor,
protesting against a certain number of injustices after imputing them to
the Head of the Faculty. In this letter he threatened to appeal to the judi-
ciary system. A lot of trouble was caused by this letter, as the letter
caused strong resentment on the part of the Head of Faculty. After a
few years, Pippo De Lorenzo, meeting a mutual friend, tells him:
1) If you meet the head of the faculty, please pass him my regards and
tell him that I sincerely wish him well.
On reflection, there is a clash here between the individual path of inter-
pretation and the social path of interpretation (the resulting irony). We
do not know whether Pippo De Lorenzo is sincere in expressing his inten-
tions. However, let us suppose that he is. In this case, the social intention-
ality prevails over the individual intentionality and no matter how sincere
his words can be and how laborious Pippo De Lorenzo’s e¤orts to em-
phasise his sincerity by using words such as ‘‘sincerely’’, the conventional
e¤ects of the words are undone by the pragmatic inferences that arise in
context as a result of the social intentionality.
If he really cares to communicate a serious message of reconciliation,
Pippo should either abort his intentions or carry out some reparatory
moves such as the following:
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Making peace with the head of the Faculty;
Ensuring that his apologies are accepted;
Creating a cordiality context that justifies his sincere expression of the
words he wants to utter through (1).
I assume that some will take this example as supporting a view of prag-
matics based on the hearer’s reconstruction of communicative intentions.
On the contrary, the example above supports the idea that there can be
no communicative project unless the individual and the social intentional-
ity work in tandem. When there is a divorce between the two, the com-
municative project has to be abandoned. Pippo De Lorenzo should, in
fact, either abort his communicative project or ensure that the individual
and the social intentionality work in tandem, by altering the context
through the steps proposed above.
4. Explicatures as developed logical forms
Levinson (1983) opts for a negative definition of pragmatics—pragmatics
deals with non-truth conditional meaning. This view is tidy and orderly:
semantics is the basis for conversational implicatures (Levinson accepts
the slogan pragmatics ¼ meaning truth-conditions). However, as a final
note, Levinson (1983) voices some doubts that this tidy and simplistic
picture can be maintained, mainly due to examples provided by radical
pragmaticists.
Although various authors have talked about the role played by prag-
matic inference in constructing a propositional form (e.g. Bach 1994;
Levinson 2000; Recanati 2004; Stainton 1998), in this paper I shall con-
centrate on Carston’s (2002) idea of pragmatic contribution to the propo-
sition expressed, which has something distinctive because, unlike Bach,
she believes that pragmatics contributes to what is said and, unlike Levin-
son (2000), she believes that the inferences that develop logical forms into
propositional forms are explicatures, not implicatures6. The examples
that show the role played by pragmatics in fleshing out a propositional
form are roughly of the following type:
(2) I am feeling better today;
(3) On the top shelf (uttered by a speaker who realizes that the hearer,
making his breakfast, needs the marmalade);
(4) He wasn’t wearing his glasses and mistook his wife for a hat-stand;
(5) This fruit is green;
(6) It is raining.
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To express a full proposition, (2) must imply a comparison between the
present and a previous state (how the speaker was feeling, say, yesterday).
(3) is clearly an elliptical utterance: it is not grammatically complete and
requires the addition of a subject and of a verb. (4) is a case in which con-
junction contributes a causality notion to the full proposition expressed.
(5) also needs pragmatic intrusion, as without contextual knowledge we
are left in doubt as to whether the outside of the fruit is green or whether
the interior is so; (6) also says that it is raining here, in the location where
both the speaker and the hearer are situated.
Carston (2002a, 17) believes that examples such as the ones above dem-
onstrate that, in addition to a speaker meaning more than she says, the
‘‘what is said’’ of the utterance may involve more than the mere meaning
of the linguistic expression used. Thus we have to distinguish two notions:
the linguistic meaning encoded in the lexical-syntactic form employed,
and the thought or proposition which it is being used to express, that is,
what is said.
This exemplifies the underdeterminacy thesis, the view that the mean-
ing encoded in the linguistic expressions used underdetermines what is
said. The hearer must resort to pragmatic inference in order to work out
the proposition expressed by an utterance.
Carston proposes the Isomorphism Principle, a recent formulation of
which is the one in Fodor and Lepore (1991):
If a sentence S expresses the proposition P, then the syntactic constituents of S ex-
press the constituents of P.
This approach allows that pragmatic processes can supply constituents to
what is said solely on communicative grounds, without any linguistic
pointer, in which case the Isomorphism Principle does not hold. The
move of abandoning the Isomorphism Principle is welcome, because it
allows us to assign a proposition constituents which do not appear in the
corresponding sentence’s logical form.
4.1. An alternative view (Bach 1994).
According to Bach (1994: 124), what is said does not correspond to a full
proposition determined through pragmatic inference, but corresponds to
a minimal proposition or to a propositional radical and is constrained by
the following assumption:
The elements of what is said must correspond to elements in the linguistic expres-
sion (the sentence under consideration).
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Bach’s test for distinguishing what is said is provided by the following
schema: ‘‘S said that . . .’’ He claims that only those elements of the origi-
nal utterance that can be embedded without infelicity in the schema
above are part of what is said.
Otherwise, Bach agrees with Relevance Theorists that pragmatics is
needed to flesh out the proposition a speaker intends to express. He calls
such pragmatic inferences ‘‘implicitures,’’ and distinguishes between two
pragmatic processes involved in the working out of implicitures: comple-
tion and expansion. Completion is required for those sentences which do
not express a full proposition. Expansion is required for those cases in
which a sentence does express a full proposition but this cannot be con-
sidered to be the proposition a speaker really intends to express.
I think that Bach’s picture is not incoherent, albeit an approach that
considers ‘‘what is said’’ to be a propositional level of thought commends
itself more. Perhaps a testing case for which notion of what is said must
be adopted is furnished by ironic utterances. Here, in the absence of rich
contextual clues (the original context in which the words were pro¤ered),
it would be misleading to quote the words contained in the original utter-
ance, as these may lead to a misrecognition of the communicative inten-
tion accompanying them. In any case, I accept that the expression ‘‘what
is said’’ may be understood in two senses: what is A-said, the words ut-
tered, and what is B-said, the thought communicated.
4.2. A paradoxical example of explicature
Cappelen and Lepore (2005: 64–65) are unconvinced by the standard ex-
amples of radical pragmaticists. They believe that if the standard exam-
ples of explicature do not have invariant truth-conditions, it could be
shown that no sentence has invariant truth conditions. Consider the
sentence:
(7) John went to the gym.
One could argue that this sentence is not truth-evaluable since one could
always ask: how did he get to the gym? Did he walk to the vicinity? What
did he do in the gym? I think that the authors assert that if we think hard
enough, then every example of language use will exhibit semantic under-
determination, simply because we set the standards of truth-evaluability
too high.
Montminy (2006: 14), commenting on Cappelen and Lepore’s work,
writes that this treatment of Incompleteness Arguments conflates lack of
full specificity with incompleteness, contrasting cases in which a sentence
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is not completely informative with cases in which the standing meaning of
a sentence does not determine a complete, truth-evaluable proposition.
The point Montminy probably misses is that there is such a wide gap
between the interpretation of (8) as (9) and of (9) as (10)
(8) John went to the gym;
(9) John went to the vicinity of the gym:
(10) John went into (inside) the gym,
One is tempted to say that this too is a case of semantic underdetermina-
tion: the full(er) proposition provided by enriching the propositional rad-
ical ought to be something like the following (if we accept Cappelen and
Lepore 2005):
John went (in)to an area vast enough to include the gym and its close vicinity.
Determining this proposition requires some narrowing down, that is to
say the addition of some concept. A move open to Montminy, which he
does not make, is to take what Cappelen and Lepore say for good and
argue that this is a case in which pragmatics intervenes to enrich a truth-
evaluable proposition; and there is nothing wrong about this. Yet, this
would not be like saying that no proposition at all is expressed by (12).
An alternative move would be to deny the acceptability of the data
provided by Cappelen and Lepore. In any case, Montminy does not ap-
preciate the real point of Cappelen and Lepore’s discussion, which is, a
refinement of the question: how do we know when something is a full
proposition? Is not there some latitude in deciding whether an interpreta-
tion (whether semantically or pragmatically accessed) is a full proposi-
tion? Could we not push this latitude further up in our search for
complete propositions? Finally, what does the expression ‘‘a complete
proposition’’ mean?7 This final question is important, since all researchers
in the semantics/pragmatics debate propose the priority of pragmatic in-
ference on the grounds that semantic interpretation does not provide a
full proposition. Presumably, a full proposition is the minimal proposi-
tion that is truth-evaluable. However, if we are pedantic enough, we
could always say that a proposition is not truth-evaluable and that we
need (further) pragmatic inference to arrive at a truth-evaluable proposi-
tion. The problem is: where do we stop? It may be worth noting that
truth-conditions mean something di¤erent for minimalists and contextu-
alists. Minimalists are not interested in what the world would have to be
like for the sentence/utterance to be true (which they call verification pro-
cedure), but merely in the formal procedure: ‘‘p’’ is true i¤ p, even if p is
incomplete. Given this distinction, it goes without saying that contextual-
ists are more exigent when deciding whether a sentence expresses a full
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proposition. However, as Lepore (personal communication) says, mini-
malists are not at all surprised to find out that many of the propositions
we communicate are absurd, illogical, a priori falsehoods and they do not
think that it is the task of semanticists to account for these uses.
The considerations so far are applicable to Carston’s work as well. Is it
possible that if one thinks hard enough, every linguistic example requires
pragmatic development into a proposition? Carston is not scared of this
consequence, as she professes to be interested in knowing whether the
gap between linguistic meaning and what is said is a contingent or neces-
sary property of verbal communication (Carston 2002a, 15) and she has a
chapter in which she discusses whether pragmatic intrusion is a necessary
feature of human communication.
4.3. Explicatures
Explicatures (those assumptions which are required to make a proposi-
tion truth-evaluable) must be di¤erentiated neatly from implicatures.
The notion of ‘‘explicature’’ is originally due to Sperber and Wilson
(1986: 54) who write:
(I) An assumption by an utterance U is explicit (hence an ‘‘explica-
ture’’) if and only if it is a development of a logical form encoded
by U.
(II) An assumption communicated by U which is not explicit is implicit
(hence an ‘‘implicature’’).
Carston (2002a: 117) argues that, along with pragmatic processes trig-
gered by linguistic expressions, there are ‘‘free’’ pragmatic processes that
determine certain elements of the explicature on a purely contextual basis.
She believes that the content of explicatures comes from two distinct
sources, the linguistic expressions used and the context, and it is derived
in two distinct ways depending on its source. She claims that the logical
form, which is the output of the decoding phase, is solely a schema for
the inferential construction of fully propositional assumptions.
Burton-Roberts speculates that Carston implies that explicatures are a
development of the logical form L of the sentence uttered, if and only if P
(asymmetrically) entails L8. For example, if I say ‘‘He shrugged and left’’
meaning (via explicature) ‘‘He shrugged and then left,’’ it must be the
case that the latter proposition implies that the explicature entails the
encoded form it is a development of. Burton-Roberts (2005: 397) con-
tends that ‘‘If the encoded form can be entailed, it must deliver a truth-
evaluable proposition’’ and this could be a problem with the notion of de-
velopment. Below, I discuss that cases of loosening cause a problem for
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the notion that an explicature entails the logical form from which it takes
input.
5. Are explicatures cancellable?
Both Burton-Roberts (2006) and Capone (2006) converge on the idea that
explicatures cannot be cancelled. In the following sections, I discuss
Burton-Roberts (2006) and Capone (2006), in the hope to extend that
discussion.
5.1. Burton-Roberts (2005) on the non-cancelability of explicatures
It is interesting to see what Burton-Roberts (2005: 400–401) has to say on
cancelability (of explicatures) in his review of Carston (2002a). The au-
thor claims that it is not possible, in Carston’s own terms, that explica-
tures should be cancellable. In fact, Carston says that the implicated
assumptions that constitute the explicature are part of the proposition ex-
pressed and, thus, are truth-conditional in nature. On this view, [þtruth-
conditional] does imply [cancellable]. If none of the truth-conditional
content of the explicature can be cancelled, the explicature itself should
not be cancellable. Cancellable implicature, then, is a logical impossibility
according to Burton-Roberts9.
Carston may find the idea that explicatures cannot be cancelled unpal-
atable because if her notion of explicature is to focus on the central role
of pragmatics in human communication, freezing the implicatures in the
notion of non-cancellable explicatures will amount to a non-insignificant
concession to truth-conditional semantics. Readers may notice that
Burton-Roberts’ objections (to Carston) come from the perspective of
truth-conditional semantics.
Burton-Roberts considers an example Carston discusses on p. 138:
(11) She’s ready but Karen isn’t ready to leave for the airport.
Carston says that the explicature of ‘‘She’s ready’’ can be cancelled, be-
cause the sentence (11) is not contradictory. Burton-Roberts, correctly ar-
gues that the sentence (11) cannot be contradictory; it is statements that
are contradictory: ‘‘contradiction must be assessed at the (propositional)
level of explicature’’. Burton-Roberts’ position is in line with my own
considerations. He is right saying that (11) is not evidence in favor of the
cancelability of explicatures. In particular, he believes that ‘‘She is ready’’
in (11) can be interpreted in three ways:
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(12) Pat is ready at time t to leave for the airport
(13a) Karen is ready at time t to leave for the airport x;
(13b) Karen is ready for something (though we do not know what).
If interpretation (12) holds, the second clause of (11) surely does not con-
tradict it. If interpretation (13b) holds, the second clause of (11) does not
cancel it either. So (13a) must be the explicature Carston has in mind. But
it is precisely (13a) that is contradicted by the second clause of (11).
5.2. Further considerations of non-cancellable explicatures
Burton-Roberts (2006) distinguishes between A-saying and B-saying.
A-saying is taken to be the literal words expressed in an utterance, which
can be reported in abstraction from the original context in which they
were produced (presumably to fix an intention). Roughly, A-saying corre-
sponds to the words actually pro¤ered by a speaker in communication
(Burton-Roberts 2005 says that to report what a speaker has A said we
must [and need only] quote her utterance); B-saying, instead, involves
the assessment (the individuation) of the thought the speaker explicitly in-
tended to communicate, and this may involve putting together both the
words used and pragmatic assumptions of the context to arrive at explica-
tures and to add these to what was literally expressed. B-saying involves
fixing the speaker’s communicative intention. Burton-Roberts (personal
communication) adds:
In fact, to report a B-saying you don’t have to use any of the actual
words that were A-said. Thus, to accurately report what you B-said
when you A-said ‘‘Fa caldo’’ (It’s warm in here) I can report you as hav-
ing said that it was hot. Similarly a person who A-says ‘‘It’s at 12 o
clock’’ can be reported by ‘‘She said the meeting was at noon.’’
Burton-Roberts notices that Carston’s claim that explicatures are can-
cellable shifts emphasis from the speaker’s intentions to the hearer’s re-
construction of these intentions, a move that is dubious in his opinion,
since both for Grice and Sperber and Wilson (1986; 2005) pragmatics is
all about intention. Burton-Roberts’ insistence on the logical impossibility
of cancelling explicatures is something that is immediately appealing. Yet,
we have to ponder a bit what it means to endorse or commit oneself to an
explicature. Carston says that a speaker endorses explicatures, and that
she commits herself to them—yet what is it to endorse a proposition,
what is it to express commitment to it? Much depends on the way we de-
fine ‘‘commitment’’ and ‘‘endorsing a proposition.’’ In a sense a speaker
commits herself and endorses a proposition through conversational impli-
cature as well—and if we go along with what Burton-Roberts says then
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there is no subtle di¤erence between particularized implicatures and expli-
catures (actually Burton-Roberts [personal communication] stresses that
he only said that with PCI a speaker commits herself to having implicated
the proposition). If a proposition is actually implicated, it cannot be un-
implicated, that is cancelled without contradiction of the executed inten-
tion to implicate). Particularized implicatures are quite strong commit-
ments to a proposition.
We may want to distinguish between potential explicatures and actual
explicatures. Explicatures (without the asterisk) are those that a speaker
commits herself to and explicitly endorses. Explicatures* are only poten-
tially endorsable, things which a speaker potentially commits herself to.
Thus explicatures* are cancellable (so Carston would say) while explica-
tures are not. So, in a sense both Carston and Burton-Roberts are right.
Yet, I do not despair that (only) Burton-Roberts is right if explicatures
are a more restricted class than what Carston takes to be (a move that
circumvents some problems noted by Cappelen and Lepore 2005). Sup-
pose that we confine ourselves to calling ‘‘explicatures’’ those inferential
increments that are meant to supply a full proposition, where none is sup-
plied by bare semantics, or to rescue a proposition from contradiction or
logical impossibility (absurdity). These explicatures are in no obvious way
‘‘potential explicatures’’. They are necessitated by the contingencies of
communication and by the fact that logical forms are too fragmentary
or present wide lacunae. Since in these cases there are no explicatures*,
Burton-Roberts is right in saying that explicatures cannot be cancelled.
Capone (2006) considers some examples of pragmatic intrusion such as
(14), (15) and (16):
(14) If the king of France died and France became a republic, I would
be happy, but if France became a republic and the king of France
died, I would be unhappy;
(15) Take these three plates to those three people over there;
(16) You will die (said to John who has just cut his arm).
Capone (2006) asserts that cancelling a causality implicature, which al-
lows us to make sense of an otherwise contradictory statement, results in
an unacceptable utterance: hence in this case it is not possible to build the
propositional form while allowing for pragmatic intrusion, and then
cancel the related implicature without rendering the discourse incoherent.
While in ordinary cases of implicature cancellation, the speaker can still
be considered to have said something intelligible; in cases where prag-
matics contributes in a decisive way to the propositional form, such a
contribution cannot be withdrawn without causing havoc.
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It may be suggested that a crucial way of proving that explicatures are
not cancellable is to point out that they are part of a speaker’s intentions.
Presumably one of Carston’s reasons in claiming that explicatures are
cancellable is that she thinks the hearer entertains the proposition con-
veyed by the speaker with a high degree of probability but never with cer-
tainty (he can go wrong in the process of utterance interpretation). As
Saul (2004) and Burton-Roberts (2005) point out, relevance theorists
focus on utterance interpretation, rather than on utterance production,
and this may very well lead them away from recognizing the central im-
portance of a speaker’s communicative intentions, which must be a guide
to utterance interpretation in so far as it manifests itself through semantic
clues and pragmatic strategies (see also Bach 1998). Since intentions in
some cases are fixed, it goes without saying that explicatures, which are
the correlate of those intentions, should be non-cancellable. Saul points
out that the speaker’s manifest intentions are fixed and that while the pro-
cess of interpretation may provide one or more interpretations which are
or are not in line with the original intentions, the communicative process
started with those intentions and it is those that crucially matter. We
should not be surprised, therefore, that there are loci in conversation
where failure to attribute a certain communicative intention deprives the
utterance of truth-evaluability and making the case of non-cancelability
compelling.
If Carston replies that some cases of explicatures are the correlates
of intentions but are nevertheless cancellable, one may reply that inten-
tionality comes in various degrees and that we have some weaker and
stronger forms of intentionality. Explicatures correlate with the stronger
level of intentionality. If there is a stronger level of intentionality, then
explicatures cannot be cancelled, because they express intentions of the
strongest type.
Is it reasonable to assume that there are di¤erent degrees of inten-
tionality and that, specifically, intentionality comes in the weaker and
stronger variety? Although I do not see this point discussed in the
literature on communicative intentions in great detail, I think we could
appropriate of ideas by Castelfranchi and Paglieri (2007) on a construc-
tive theory of intentions. Although the intentions they discuss are not spe-
cifically communicative, they are mainly intentions to act. For example, I
may form the intention to send a paper to JL for publication or I may
form the intention to write a book. It may be safely assumed that com-
municative intentions are a subtype of the intentions Castelfranchi and
Paglieri discuss, as it is possible for someone to form the intention to
communicate P to H to inform her of the truth of P. Telling or informing
someone of P can be seen as a form of acting. Castelfranchi and Paglieri
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provide a detailed analysis of the role of beliefs in goal processing—that
resides in the cognitive transition from a mere desire (what they call a
‘‘pro-attitude’’) to a proper intention. The main point of the paper is
that goal processing and intention revision are largely determined by be-
lief revisions and that, in order to activate, promote, drop, or suspend a
goal, an intention, or an intentional action, one has to provide or modify
the appropriate beliefs. Surely such a constructive theory of intentions
presupposes that intentions come in various degrees. Concerning the
action A, one can have stronger or weaker intentions. Stronger intention-
ality, as the authors say, is activated by the provision of beliefs—so the
greater the connection between an intention and a set of beliefs, the
greater the likelihood that such beliefs will have an influence on the inten-
tion and will modify its degree of intentionality by allowing it to move
from the sphere of potential intentionality to the sphere of actual inten-
tionality. I assume that as we move from one sphere to the other, one
can find di¤erent degrees of intentionality. Now, on the assumption that
communicative intentions are a subclass of the intentions Castelfranchi
and Paglieri discuss—and this assumption is not implausible for a theory
in which we stress the connection between language and action—
we should suppose that beliefs interact with intentions not only at the
level of intention formation, but also at the level of intention recon-
struction by the hearer. A process analogous to the intention construc-
tion occurs, and the beliefs assumed to be in the head of the speaker,
which are mutually manifest to the hearer, can play a role in allowing
the hearer to infer the degree of intentionality involved in the communi-
cative action.
Now we return to explicatures. The reason why explicatures correlate
with a stronger form of intentionality is that they arise in circumstances
where there cannot be an ‘‘out’’ for the speaker, where the communica-
tive intention proceeds along the only path available, outside which im-
puting di¤erent intentions becomes so implausible as to impair rational
communication. Explicatures are not there to rescue the utterance from
defective communicative e¤ects, such as lack of informativeness, lack of
relevance, or lack of quality, but are there to furnish an uttered proposi-
tion, the condition sine qua non for evaluating all other communicative
deficiencies. The kind of deficiencies which explicatures have to remedy
have to do with the lack of a truth-evaluable proposition or with the
lack of a plausible truth-evaluable proposition, one which is not irremedi-
ably contaminated by ‘‘a priori’’ contradiction or logical absurdity. It is
exactly these cases which shape intentionality within the strict mould of
the rational assessment of the thought the utterance must be taken to
express.
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On the relevance-theoretic view, we should also consider higher-order
explicatures, which are the processes assigning illocutionary force to an
utterance. Now, I think that if what we have said about the intentionality
of explicatures is true, it must be applicable to higher-order explicatures. I
have discussed the issue of the non-cancelability of inferences in discourse
at length in my paper ‘‘Pragmemes’’ (Capone 2005), where I provided
various cases of non-cancellable inferences. I would, nevertheless, like to
point out, that questions of truth are not at stake in higher-order explica-
tures. In such cases we miss the connectedness between non-cancelability
and pragmatic intrusion. We might also have a somewhat di¤erent story,
considering the fact that utterances can be multi-functional at the level of
illocutionary force. I do not expect that all considerations concerning
pragmatic intrusion are applicable to higher-order explicatures.
5.3. On the connection between non-cancelability of explicatures and
pragmatic intrusion
Suppose it is accepted that explicatures are cancellable. Then we have
problems explaining how explicatures are part of the truth-conditional
content of a sentence. Surely, one of the advantages of claiming that an
inference is truth-conditional is that it is part of the entailments of a sen-
tence (thus, non-cancellable). If we do not want the content obtained
through pragmatic intrusion to be part of the entailments of the sentence,
why make so much fuss about pragmatic intrusion? After all, we could
have a very orderly picture like that of Cappelen and Lepore (2005) in
which what is said is mainly associated with linguistic semantics. The
various contextual phenomena which we claim to be part of the truth-
conditional content of a sentence could be easily assigned at the level of
the utterance. Is this what we want? Presumably a radical contextual
claim is one that assigns constituents derived through pragmatics inside
the sentential content. Considering explicatures non-cancellable is more
coherent with the view that pragmatics provides constituents of thought
that intrude into the sentential level of meaning, since entailments are
not entailments unless one cannot deny them. One of the classical tests
for entailments is the one by Strawson: if S entails P, one cannot utter S
and say not P. So now my question is, do we have enough courage to
argue in favor of full pragmatic intrusion? If we have, then we should ac-
cept that explicatures cannot be cancelled.
It may simplify matters if we consider the explicature as a two-level en-
tity, consisting of the entailments of the sentence uttered and the prag-
matic increment that goes into the explicature. This segregational
approach will not do, because both the entailments and the pragmatic
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increments are subject to pragmatic processing. The entailments of the
sentence uttered are promoted to being part of the speaker’s commitment
only after pragmatics rules out, e.g. ironic interpretations. The pragmatic
increments are combined with the semantic entailments of the sentence
uttered only after such entailments are promoted through pragmatics to
intended meaning. At this point, there is no more reason for segregating
the constituents of the explicature, the semantic entailments deriving from
the sentence and the pragmatic increments based on them and on contex-
tual assumptions.
The objection I expect at this point is the following. But then, if this is
the way things are, why also accept that conversational implicatures are
non-cancellable? First of all, I only confined myself to the claim that par-
ticularized conversational implicatures are not cancellable. Second, the
question is not whether it is advantageous to consider conversational im-
plicatures cancellable, but whether it is fruitful to consider explicatures
non-cancellable. The di¤erence in the argumentation in favor of non-
cancellable particularized implicatures and of non-cancellable explica-
tures is that there are theoretical reasons due to pragmatic intrusion for
insisting that explicatures are non-cancellable, whereas in the case of par-
ticularized conversational implicatures we can only resort to arguments
based on intentionality. Thus there are stronger theoretical reasons in the
case of explicatures for claiming that they are non-cancellable.
6. Refining the notion of explicature further
Let us accept the following assumptions by Grundy (2000: 53).
A. Explicatures amount to constitutive aspects of what is explicitly said;
B. Explicatures are not linguistically encoded but have to be pragmati-
cally expressed;
C. Speakers are committed to the explicature of an utterance;
D. Explicatures are part of what is communicated and, thus, are overtly
endorsed by a speaker.
F. Explicatures are motivated by the indeterminacy of language.
Given all the previous discussion, one should add that explicatures are in-
ferences that partially use linguistic meaning and partially use contextual-
ization clues in order to determine the speaker’s unequivocal intention.
An explicature is, therefore, the reconstruction of an intention on the
basis of what a speaker says in communication in response to the need
to reach a full proposition. The full proposition reconstructed by the
hearer is one that cannot be cancelled explicitly and one that can be dis-
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tinguished from implicatures due to the fact that implicatures are addi-
tional increments on top of explicatures. Explicatures are more funda-
mental increments, as without them the proposition expressed would be
either contradictory or false or communicatively very ine‰cient even at
the sentential level. Explicatures are explicit in that they cannot be denied.
We should distinguish real explicatures from potential explicatures. Po-
tential explicatures, like potential implicatures, are not cases of real inten-
tionality (or of real intentionality assignment) but are hypothetical cases
of intentionality assignment. When one deals with potential implicatures
and potential explicatures one says something like: On the basis of ‘‘S’’
(the syntactic and semantic features of S) and on the basis of the fact
that the speaker had a reason to use S (and did not use an alternative to
S), the speaker intends that P, unless F, where F is some proposition to be
derived from the assumptions manifest in context. The clause UNLESS F
focuses on the hypothetical nature of potential implicatures and *explica-
tures. However, as far actual explicatures are concerned there can be no
‘‘UNLESS F’’ clause. The calculation process in actual explicatures is
quickly over and nothing else can be done with it. We can no longer think
of it and process it further in the light of other assumptions. The process
leading to explicatures should be finite (both in the sense that we usually
do not spend a long time in coming to an explicature, and in the sense
that when we acquire the propositional elements that are relevant to the
case, we process the utterance, come up with an explicature and close the
interpretation process for good). An explicature case is not like a reason-
ing case where the evidence is sifted and then the experts come to a deci-
sion and the decision process could be reopened at any moment like a
trial in which new evidence may determine a completely di¤erent out-
come. An explicature case is closed when the communicative exchange
moves beyond the next utterance. Thus, the evidence that is relevant to
the communicative process is the evidence available at t, where t is some
temporal variable that is indexed to the time of the utterance whose expli-
cature we seek to elucidate and is upper-bounded by t 0, where t 0 is in-
dexed to the utterance next to it. By the time u 0 is uttered, the explicature
of u is calculated on the basis of the evidence available at the moment and
the case is not opened further. If we sought further evidence and if u were
contextualized say at di¤erent moments, t 0, t 00, t 000, etc. the explicature
could very well be di¤erent. So an utterance could, in theory, be associ-
ated with distinct explicatures. In order to avoid this inconvenience, we
have to keep the interpretation process finite. This is in line with the point
that an explicature captures a unique intention. If the utterance were con-
sidered at di¤erent moments, di¤erent interpretative possibilities should
arise (given the fact that di¤erent evidence might be available at di¤erent
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moments). But this is not possible since we have said that the intention to
be assigned must be unique.
These considerations are compatible with what Sperber and Wilson
(1986) say about utterance interpretation. They also argue that the inter-
pretation process is finite and instantaneous—in other words, when the
best interpretation is obtained the process stops. I think that my consider-
ations on the intentionality of explicatures make these considerations co-
gent and provide further justification for them.
It will not be accepted that relevance-theory should be just a theory
about the hearer’s interpretations. The main reasons in favor of non-
cancelability of explicatures also favor taking RT as a theory of speaker’s
and hearer’s interpretations, a theory which has su‰cient power to guar-
antee that the speaker’s intentions and the intentions inferred by the
hearer match. They must match because the speaker and the hearer rely
on the same principles, because their minds are similar in their constitu-
tion and because they share the same cognitive inputs as well as a number
of contextual assumptions that are mutually manifest.
The issue of the non-cancelability of explicatures is inherently con-
nected with the issue of the match between speaker and hearer’s (as-
signed) intentions. It’s easy to prove this. If there were, say, no speaker-
hearer’s match in intentions, we should allow for the possibility that the
speaker’s and the hearer’s (inferred) intentions could go along separate
paths. It would thus be possible to cancel at least one type of intentions.
But the idea that explicatures are not cancellable simply denies that either
one type or the other type of intention can be denied To accept that ex-
plicatures are not cancellable in the sense of accepting that the hearer’s
intentions are not cancellable (without mentioning the speaker’s inten-
tions) leads to nowhere, since one reason the hearer’s intentions are not
cancellable is that they aim to reconstruct the speaker’s intentions. Once
we give up the idea that the hearers’ intentions aim to reconstruct the
speaker’s intentions, there is no reason to stick to the idea that explica-
tures are not cancellable. From the hearer’s point of view they could
very well be cancellable, as in the circumstances in which a hearer evalu-
ates di¤erent readings of an utterance without being under pressure to un-
cover the speaker’s intentions.
Returning to the issue of whether the relationship between an explica-
ture and the logical form giving input to it is one of entailment, one
should consider that an explicature consists of both a logical form and
of some implicated materials which are added to the logical form (let us
suppose that logical conjunction is what serves to connect the two in the
most simple cases; instead, subtraction is the logical operation involved in
cases of loosening). Now, if this is the notion of explicature we adopt, it
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clear that it should entail the logical form it derives from in the cases
where explicature is an operation based on conjunction. Of course, an ex-
plicature under this view should be subject to strong constraints including
that the implicated materials be compatible with the logical form the ex-
plicature is a development of.
For an explicature to be non-cancellable we need to assume that both
the implicated part and the explicit logical form to be developed are non-
cancellable elements of meaning. In a sense, even the logical form that is
being developed is subject to pragmatic inference, since it must be
mapped to a serious intention and the assignment of serious intentions is
primarily a matter of pragmatics. On the basis of this pragmatic process
of intention assignment, some implicated materials are assigned to the ex-
plicature and made compatible with the logical form that gave input to
them. It is inevitable that this should be a two stage process, with a dou-
ble assignment of intentionality.
There are pragmatic processes that contribute to explicatures, such as
loosening (‘‘Sicily is a triangle’’) in which one cannot proceed in this
way. Surely one cannot map the logical form ‘‘Sicily is a triangle’’ to a
serious intention and the implicated materials ‘‘Sicily has vaguely the
shape of a triangle’’ when they are added to the logical form that gives
input to them require a loosening of the intentionality mapped tentatively
to the logical form ‘‘Sicily has the shape of a triangle.’’ Compatibility
must be maximized and this is done by loosening one level of intentional-
ity. We must accept that the explicature must have only one level of
intentionality and that conjunction is, therefore, not the right logical op-
eration in the case of explicature derivation in cases of loosenings. Expli-
cature derivation sometimes involves addition, sometimes involves sub-
traction. If addition is involved (ordinary conjunction) then two levels of
intentionality clearly merge into one level of intentionality. If subtraction
is the logical operation involved in explicature derivation then we have
two levels of intentionality (non-serious; serious), but only one of them
prevails. The implicated materials prevail over the literally stated logical
form. In this case, the intentionality of the explicature is inherited from
the intentionality of the implicated materials. Therefore, explicature deri-
vation requires some (pragmatic) compositionality at the level of the
levels of intentionality, due to the assumption (we have accepted) that
the two components of the explicature must be compatible. (Pragmatic)
compositionality means we must have some principles determining which
level of intentionality prevails. In the case of conjunction, compositional-
ity derives from the logical operation ‘‘logical conjunction’’ and the com-
patibility assumption. In the case of subtraction, compositionality derives
from the compatibility assumption plus the assumption that at least one
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level of intentionality must project at the strongest global level. The inten-
tionality ‘‘Sicily has roughly the shape of a triangle’’ has a stronger level
of intentionality than ‘‘Sicily is a triangle’’ given that, due to shared
knowledge, it cannot be the case that Sicily is a perfect triangle. Having
decided which is the stronger level of intentionality, this will project at
the level of the global explicature. The fact that the explicature, broadly
speaking, cannot be cancelled logically implies that in case the two com-
ponents of the explicature are constituted by two distinct incompatible
levels of intentionality, only one can project: they cannot both project as
this would jeopardize the notion that the explicature is not cancellable.
A consequence of the discussion so far is that cases of explicatures
based on loosening, in so far as they use the logical operation of subtrac-
tion, jeopardize the definition that explicatures entail the logical forms
they are developments of. In fact, a loose triangle obviously does not en-
tail a triangle. Nevertheless, there should be a logical operation requiring
that the explicature entails something like the logical form it is a develop-
ment of. To be more precise, the explicature ‘‘Sicily has the rough shape
of a triangle’’ requires that we look at a triangle to see what the real shape
of Sicily is like.
Thus an explicature is a process of the following kind:
Starting from a logical form S, develop S by bearing the Principle of Relevance
into account and add the feature Te (truth-evaluability) to u (S) as a consequence
of the consideration that u(S)/Te has greater contextual e¤ects and fewer cogni-
tive costs than u(S)/sTe.
The approach so far is minimally distinct from Sperber and Wilson or
Carston’s, who argue that in specific cases the search for relevance leads
to the construction of explicatures. Instead, I argue on general grounds
that explicatures that maximize truth-evaluability are preferable on the
grounds of the Principle of Relevance.
I would like to tie the notion of explicature to that of assertion in com-
munication. We will not make much progress in pragmatics unless we
recognize that explicatures are part of assertions. The considerations so
far significantly cohere with what Stainton (1994: 280) says about asser-
tions, revising considerations by Sperber and Wilson (1986):
An utterance U is an assertion that P if and only if:
(a) Either P is the propositional form of U (i.e. P results merely by completing
the Logical Form of U—i.e. by disambiguating it, enriching it and assigning
it reference) or P could result merely by completing the Logical Form of U
and conjoining it with another manifest Logical Form of the appropriate se-
mantic type: and
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(b) P is consistent with the presumption of optimal relevance (i.e. U actually
communicates P).
In other words, Stainton too believes that explicatures form part of
the asserted proposition and, thus, is implicitly committed to the non-
cancelability of explicatures.
7. Conclusion
This paper has assumed that pragmatic intrusion is a rather general phe-
nomenon in language use and that Carston’s notion of ‘‘explicature’’ is
very important. This notion may need refinement, and I have shown
what kind of facts have to be taken into consideration for this purpose.
Cancelability seems to me to be an important fact leading to some theo-
retical revision. Furthermore, the fact that in some cases it is di‰cult to
distinguish between implicatures and explicatures if merely empirical
facts such as cancellation are considered, will inevitably lead us to tighten
up the definition of explicatures.
Jaszczolt (personal communication) says that Carston may find the
idea of non-cancellable explicatures problematic in that it goes against
the idea of nonce-inference (context-driven inference) and makes explica-
tures more akin to unmarked, default meanings—not Levinson’s highly
cancellable defaults, but certainly Asher and Lascarides (2003) or Jaszc-
zolt’s (1999) defaults.
This is not necessarily an implication of what I have written so far. In
Capone (2006) I have amply discussed a case of explicature that required
some kind of contextual inference. Explicatures are uncancelable not be-
cause they necessarily correspond to a level of default reference, but be-
cause the purpose they fulfill is such that it makes them uncancelable. If
they were easily cancellable, then it would be hard to see what role they
could play in establishing the full truth-conditional meaning of an utter-
ance. While it makes sense to say that a potential implicature leaves an
‘‘out’’ for the speaker, it is not very reasonable to say that explicatures
give the speaker an ‘‘out.’’ The purpose of committing oneself to a prop-
osition is to leave no room for disagreement as to what the speaker actu-
ally means.
Notes
1. I would like to express my warmest thanks to Jacob L. Mey and Yan Huang for their
feedback. I would also like to thank Noel Burton-Roberts who has provided many de-
tailed comments. Thanks are also due to Franco Lo Piparo, for his benevolent attitude
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to my research at the University of Palermo. I would also like to warmly thank Istvan
Kecskes and two referees of the journal ‘‘Intercultural Pragmatics’’, for their most useful
and constructive comments. I think they did their best in terms of maieutic discourse.
The paper has been extended considerably due to their thought-provoking comments.
All remaining errors are my own.
2. I put forward this claim in my 2003 paper, revised and reprinted in 2006.
3. PCI ¼ particularized conversational implicatures; GCI ¼ generalized conversational
implicatures.
4. I am not, however, saying that a specific pragmatic heuristic principle cannot be over-
ruled by manifest contextual assumptions. I am only saying that the ultimate pragmatic
process cannot be undone.
5. I remain open to the view that potential implicatures can be cancelled in the sense that
their potential is not fully in practice in real conversation.
6. It is fair to acknowledge that radical pragmaticists such as Cohen (1971) also discussed
the phenomenon of pragmatic intrusion. Yet, I think their contributions were only pro-
grammatic, while Carston’s contribution to this issue is systematic and fully-developed.
7. Burton-Roberts finds that talk of full propositions is bizarre. A proposition, by defini-
tion, cannot be non-truth-evaluable. He also asks: Why should a full proposition be the
minimal proposition? Well, I agree that something is either a proposition or it isn’t
and if it is must be truth-evaluable. Presumably the expression ‘‘a full proposition’’ is
redundant.
8. Burton-Roberts (personal communication) says he is just speculating that Carston, in
fact, thinks of explicatures as definable in terms of entailment (A is a development of B
i¤ A entails B). This is a reasonable speculation. Her earlier Principle of Functional In-
dependence had it that A cannot be an implicature of B if A entails B. Since a commu-
nicated assumption is EITHER an explicature OR an implicature (for RT), it follows
that any communicated assumption that entails the encoded logical form must be an ex-
plicature. So, with explicature defined in terms of ‘‘development’’, it is reasonable to
speculate that development should be defined in terms of entailment.
9. This reminds us of a worry already expressed in Levinson (2000, 166).
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